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SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS 
 
Federal 
 
2d Circuit 
 
Petroterminal De Panama v. Houston Casualty Co., 15-
2941-cv, 2016 WL 4703898 (2d Cir. Sept. 8, 2016). 
 
An insured party transported and stored oil in 
Panama. There, a pipeline failure caused an oil spill, 
and certain parties sued Insured and a firm that stored 
oil with the insured. To secure jurisdiction over the 
firm—a Swiss company—the Panamanian court issued 
an attachment of the firm’s oil. The firm later sued the 
Insured in New York for consequential damages 
associated with the spill and judicial attachment. The 
court found that the foreign court’s attachment 
amounted to a force majeure, relieving the insured of 
liability to the firm. The insured then filed this action 
against its insurer to collect costs incurred in defending 
the firm’s suit. Because the marine liability policies 
imposed a duty to indemnify—rather than defend—the 
insurer was only liable for the insured’s defense costs if 
the policies covered the firm’s claims. And because the 
attachment of the firm’s oil fell squarely within the 
policies’ exclusion provisions, the court affirmed the 
trial court and held that the insurers had no duty to 
reimburse the insured its defense costs. 
 
3d Circuit  
 
Pollock v. Energy Corp. of Am., No. 15-2648, 2016 WL 
6156313 (3d Cir. Oct. 24, 2016). 
 
An energy corporation appealed a jury verdict 
alleging not enough evidence existed for the jury to find 
that the energy corporation breached its mineral leases 
with the lessor class action group by improperly 
deducting marketing and transportation costs from 
royalty payments. Although evidence of contracts for 
sale of natural gas existed requiring the buyer pay for 
the cost of marketing and transportation, the appeals 
court held that the lessors paid a one-eighth percentage 
of the marketing and transportation costs based on 
testimony of the energy corporation’s executive. Thus, 
the court found ample evidence to support the jury 
verdict and affirmed district court ruling in favor of the 
lessors.   
 
 
   
 
5th Circuit  
 
Cazamias v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., L.P., No. 16-
40214, 2016 WL 4784029 (5th Cir. Sept. 13, 2016).  
Non-operators in two oil and gas leases brought 
an action in state court against the operator seeking 
damages and declaratory relief. The non-operator 
argued that the operator did not adhere to the joint 
operating agreement (“JOA”) after unsuccessful 
development without prompt plugging of a gas well 
no longer in operation. The operator removed the 
case to federal court on basis of diversity jurisdiction 
and counterclaimed against the non-operators under 
the state’s Natural Resources Code (“SNRC”) to 
recover plugging costs and moved for summary 
judgment on the non-operators’ claims and the 
counterclaim. The operator argued it was not subject 
to the JOA because the lease to which the JOA was 
applicable expired before the operator assumed 
control such that its obligations to plug the well were 
statutory and not contractual, and the court agreed. 
On appeal, the district court affirmed on two points: 
First, the operator was not subject to the JOA because 
the lease expired before the operator assumed 
control. Second, the operator proved it paid for 
plugging costs but the non-operators had yet to 
reimburse the operator, making the non-operators 
liable under the SNRC. 
 
10th Circuit 
 
Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, 
839 F.3d 1276 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 
An environmental group sued BLM under 
NEPA, challenging numerous drilling permits in the 
San Juan Basin. The group argued that prolific 
horizontal drilling and multi-stage fracing presented 
environmental risks for which BLM’s outdated 
resource plan did not account. The group also moved 
for a preliminary injunction to prevent drilling while 
the suit was pending. Although the group showed 
irreparable harm, the trial court denied its motion 
because the group failed to prove the other required 
elements for a preliminary injunction. The court of 
appeals—affirming the trial court on narrow 
grounds—addressed only the “substantial likelihood 
of success on the merits” prong of the test. First, the 
court determined that the trial court applied the 
proper test for “substantial likelihood” considering 
Supreme Court case law. Further, even if the 
proposed drilling was different in kind from past 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol2/iss5/7
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methods, the amount of activity and related surface 
impacts were within BLM’s anticipated levels. Finally, 
the group’s other arguments were not sufficiently 
developed to prove “substantial likelihood of success 
on the merits” under the agency-deferential standard of 
review. The court noted that because of the case’s 
interlocutory posture, the decision on the group’s 
motion would not preclude an ultimate judgment in the 
group’s favor. 
 
U.S. Energy Dev. Corp. v. Stephens Energy Grp., LLC, 
No. 15-6188, 15-6215, 2016 WL 5210888 (10th Cir. 
Sept. 21, 2016). 
 
Producer A executed a participation agreement 
(“PA”) with Producers B and C under which B and C 
agreed to join A in the development of certain lands. A 
separate joint operating agreement (“JOA”) governed 
the drilling, but both agreements named Producer C as 
operator. Later, Producer C sold D all its rights, title, 
and interests in the lands. Consistent with the PA, 
Producer C filed a form with the state regulatory 
commission to assign its operator status to D. Producer 
A argued that C’s assignment triggered the JOA’s 
resignation provision, requiring that the parties elect a 
new operator by majority vote. Producers A and B 
elected A and sought an injunction and declaration 
against D. The trial court concluded that the JOA 
outlined the terms for changing operators and, giving 
effect to those provisions, ruled for Producers A and B. 
The court of appeals reversed. Under relevant case law, 
the court presumed that contractual rights and duties are 
assignable. Moreover, the PA’s language made “rights, 
duties, and obligations”—and therefore operator 
status—assignable. Because the parties expressly 
agreed that the PA controlled conflicts between the two 
writings, the court reversed. It noted that although the 
JOA controlled operator status in some circumstances, 
it did not render operator status unassignable under the 
PA. 
 
Court of Federal Claims 
 
LCM Energy Solutions v. United States, 128 Fed. Cl. 
728 (Fed. Cl. 2016). 
 
A solar power installation company used benefits 
from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA) to install solar panel systems without 
collecting payment from customers and profiting from 
the government stimulus for renewable energy systems. 
The Treasury Department fully refunded the first 
installation for retail installation price. After several 
more installations, the Treasury reimbursed $482,504 of 
its requested $889,638, so the company sued for the 
rest. Treasury countersued with claims of fraud, asking 
the court to revoke the refund. The ARRA calls for a 
refund of thirty percent of the cost basis for solar 
energy property. The company’s solar energy 
systems and the cost of their installation undoubtedly 
qualify for a refund under ARRA; the amount owed, 
however, was thirty percent of the total cost basis 
with profit—the original amount given by the 
Treasury, not the amount requested by the company. 
Furthermore, the court found the Treasury’s 
allegations of fraud “completely unfounded” by the 
court, viewing the company’s owners as highly 
credible businessmen without college degrees and 
unlikely to plot such a complex scheme of fraud. The 
Treasury’s allowance of the full amount on the first 
installation led to the reasonable belief that the 
Treasury should reimburse the company.  
 
State 
 
Louisiana 
 
Stephenson v. Wildcat Midstream Caddo, LLC, No. 
50,982–CA, 2016 WL 6649228 (La Ct. App. Nov. 
10, 2016).  
Purported landowners (“Purported Owners”) of a 
three-acre strip containing a pipeline brought an 
action against the pipeline owner (“Pipeline”) for 
injunctive relief and money damages. The Pipeline 
bought a right-of-way agreement from a neighbor 
adjacent to the landowners to build on that strip. The 
trial court dismissed the Purported Owners’ action, 
and they appealed. The appellate court relied on the 
State Civil Code (“SCC”) to determine that the 
Purported Owners’ did not meet their burden of 
proof. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s 
decision for two reasons: First, the strip was 
susceptible to acquisitive prescription, and the 
quitclaim deed conveyance of the strip to the 
neighbor was just title making applicable the 
acquisitive prescriptions requirements of the SCC. 
Second, evidence did not suggest that the neighbor 
did not exercise a good faith possession; rather it 
constructed a fence that enclosed the strip and paid 
property taxes on the strip. Owners knew of these 
events but did not dispute the boundary lines until 
eighteen years later. 
XXI Oil & Gas, LLC v. Hilcorp Energy Co., 2016-
269, 2016 WL 5404650  (La. App. 3 Cir. Sept. 28, 
2016), reh'g denied (Nov. 9, 2016). 
 
An operator recompleted a well on a unit owned 
by the State of Louisiana, though it did not hold a 
lease. A lessee acquired a lease covering the unit and 
sued the operator for failure to provide the quarterly 
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accounting of costs required under La.R.S. 30:103.1 (“§ 
103.1”). The operator filed an exception of no cause of 
action claiming the statute did not apply to the lessee, 
which the trial court denied. The trial court granted 
partial summary judgment in favor of the lessee, and 
the operator appealed, but the appellate court affirmed 
the judgement and held monetary penalties were the 
appropriate remedy under La.R.S 30:103.2 (“§103.2”). 
The trial court entered judgement against the operator, 
and the operator again appealed, arguing that §§ 103.1 
and 103.2 do not apply to lessees and maintaining that 
the required accounting of costs for “drilling 
operations” under § 103.2 does not include post-
production costs. On appeal, the court affirmed, first 
maintaining that a mineral lessee may demand an 
accounting from an operator or producer working on 
the property covered by the lease. Next, it held that 
“drilling operations” under § 103.2 include post-
production costs because the term is clear when read in 
conjunction with § 103.1; there would otherwise be “no 
incentive for the operator or producer to provide the 
quarterly reports” under the § 103.1. Finally, the Court 
held that Operator had no standing to challenge the 
validity of the leases in such a case under the doctrine 
of “personal right,” finding that a party cannot demand 
performance of an obligation in the “absence of an 
assignment or subrogation.”  
 
Montana 
Carbon Cty. Res. Council v. Mont. Bd. of Oil & Gas 
Conservation, 380 P.3d 798 (Mont. 2016). 
 
The county’s council challenged the state board’s 
approval of an operator’s request to conduct diagnostic 
fracture injection tests. The council claimed the board 
denied it a “meaningful opportunity to participate” in 
the permit process in violation of the state constitution. 
Initially, the operator submitted a proposal to drill an 
exploratory well, and the board organized a public 
hearing when the council objected. Although the 
proposal did not mention fracing, residents testified 
regarding the council’s opposition to fracing at the site. 
The board nonetheless granted the operator’s permit. 
Later—and without another hearing—the board 
approved the operator’s request concerning the 
diagnostic tests. The council argued that this amounted 
to an expansion of the permit’s original scope because 
drilling permits allow such tests. The court sided with 
the board, which argued that the board had not 
expanded the permit’s scope. And because the tests did 
not amount to fracing, the court held that the council 
“meaningfully participated” in the board’s approval of 
the operator’s diagnostic tests. 
 
 
New Jersey  
In re Petition of S. Jersey Gas Co., 149 A.3d 13 
(App. Div. 2016). 
 
A gas company planned to construct a natural 
gas pipeline through the New Jersey Pinelands Forest 
Area and applied to the Pinelands Commission 
(“Commission”) for a permit, contingent upon a 
determination that the project complied with the 
Pinelands Comprehensive Management Plan 
(“CMP”). The Company also petitioned the Board of 
Public Utilities (“Board”) for a waiver of Municipal 
Land Use Laws (“MLUL”). The Commission 
determined the project did not meet CMP 
requirements and denied the application. The 
Commission’s Executive Director (“Director”) 
approved a second amended application. Therefore, 
the Board granted the Company’s MLUL petition. 
Environmental groups appealed, claiming that the 
Director lacked authority to find CMP compliance 
and that the Board lacked authority approve of the 
MLUL petition. On appeal, the Superior Court of 
New Jersey held that the failure of the first 
application did not divest the Commission of its 
authority to review the amended application or the 
Board of its jurisdiction to review the MLUL petition 
since the amended application and resulting 
determination by the Director were a separate matter. 
However, the Court found that the Board lacked 
authority to approve Company’s MLUL petition, as 
such a decision was contingent upon CMP 
compliance. The Court found that determinations of 
CMP compliance, including a review of 
determinations issued by the Director, fall under the 
authority of the Commission. The Court remanded 
the Director’s determination of the project’s CMP 
compliance to the Commission for review and 
instructed the Board to issue a modified order 
conditioning approval of the Company’s MLUL 
petition upon a final determination of CMP 
compliance by the Commission. 
 
Ohio 
Corban v. Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C., No. 2014-0804, 
2016 WL 4887428 (Ohio 2016).  
 
A federal court certified two question to the Ohio 
Supreme Court regarding dormant mineral rights: 
First, which version of the state law regarding 
dormant minerals applies regarding the automatic 
divestiture to the surface owner in the event of 
abandonment? And second is the payment of delay 
rentals during the primary term a title transaction and 
a saving event under state law?  For the first question, 
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the court found that the dormant mineral estate does not 
automatically pass by operation of law to the surface 
owner; the surface owner must follow the statutory 
provisions to rejoin the severed estate. Second, a delay 
rental payment constitutes neither a title transaction nor 
a savings event under state law.  
 
Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., No. 2015-0545, 
2016 WL 6519011 (Ohio Nov. 2, 2016).  
 
A federal court submitted the following certified 
question to the Ohio Supreme Court: Does Ohio follow 
the “at the well” rule or the “marketable product” rule? 
The case arose from a class action suit against a lessee 
for the underpayment of mineral royalties to the lessors. 
The court held that since the oil and gas lease in Ohio is 
a contract, that traditional rules of contract 
interpretation apply, and therefore declined to answer 
the question. Two justices dissented each arguing 
differing answers to the certified question. One justice 
uses policy based arguments to support the argument 
that Ohio follows the “marketable product” rule. The 
justice in support of the “at the well” rule looks to Ohio 
case law regarding the implied covenant to reasonable 
development. 
 
Walker v. Shondrick-Nau, No. 2014-0803, 2016 WL 
4908778 (Ohio Sept. 15, 2016). 
 
Under Ohio’s Dormant Mineral Act (“ODMA”), 
severed mineral rights merge with surface rights. Under 
the 1989 version of the ODMA, the mineral rights 
would automatically merge without any filings or 
proceedings by the surface owner or the mineral owner 
once deemed “abandoned.” The 2006 version of the 
ODMA, however, requires that the surface owner file 
an Affidavit of Abandonment of Mineral Interest and 
send a copy to the mineral owner who then has 60 days 
to respond to keep the mineral interest from merging 
with the surface rights. The property at question had its 
surface and mineral rights severed in 1965. In 2012, the 
surface owner claimed that the 1989 ODMA 
automatically merged the two interests. The mineral 
owner claimed that the 2006 ODMA applied and his 
timely response kept his property from the abandoned 
classification. The court ruled that under Corban v. 
Chesapeake Exploration, LLC, No. 2014-0804, 2016 
WL 4887428, the 1989 ODMA is not self-executing so 
the 2006 ODMA applies to any claim brought after 
2006, giving mineral owners the opportunity to retain 
their interests in the property. The surface owners filed 
a petition for certiorari in December 2016. 
 
 
 
 
Oklahoma  
Scott v. Peters, No. 114,913, 2016 WL 6216169 
(Okla. Oct. 25, 2016). 
 
A grantor brought action against a grantee 
alleging that he had intended to transfer the surface 
only and retain the mineral interest in the property. 
The grantor had executed a warranty deed conveying 
120 acres to the grantee. Three years later, the grantor 
conveyed surface rights of another 40 acres to the 
grantee by warranty deed. Although filed with the 
county clerk, the grantor did not retain any mineral 
rights in this 40-acre deed. Approximately eight 
months later, the grantor conveyed the same real 
property to a housing developer by warranty deed 
that also made no reference reserving mineral 
interests. The developer then conveyed the same 
property to a trust, also with no reference to mineral 
rights. The grantee obtained a quit-claim deed from 
the trust to clear title of all 160 acres for a mortgage 
on the property. The grantee leased those 160 acres to 
a land company. More than fourteen years later, the 
grantor filed quiet title action against the grantee for 
the mineral interests in and under the 160 acres. The 
grantee counterclaimed for slander of title. The 
grantee filed a motion for summary judgment arguing 
that the lawsuit was untimely. The trial court granted 
the grantee’s summary judgment motion. On appeal, 
the state supreme court affirmed because the statute 
of limitations began to accrue when the grantor filed 
the initial deed excluding mineral reservations.  
 
Pennsylvania 
 
Birdie Assocs, L.P. v. CNX Gas Co., LLC, 2016 PA 
Super 228 (Pa. Super. Oct. 20, 2016). 
 
Landowners leased to a coal mining company the 
right to mine for “coal and its constituent products” 
on roughly 300 acres of land. The agreement was for 
a monthly royalty and a tonnage royalty off coal 
sales. The coal mining company never actually sold 
any coal and even stated that it was not its intention 
to mine the coal. Instead, the company sold the coal 
bed methane gas (“CBM”) from the mine without 
paying any CBM royalty to the landowners. 
Landowners sued claiming that the coal company 
owed them royalty on the CBM pursuant to a statute 
granting landowners a royalty on gas sold from their 
land. Pennsylvania law, however, established that 
when a landowner leases the right to mine for coal 
and its constituent products, the landowner “sells” the 
coal and its constituent products to the coal mining 
company. Under this doctrine, the coal mining 
company had already purchased the coal and the 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
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CBM, so it owed no royalty to the landowners on the 
sale of CBM. 
 
Texas 
 
Greer v. Shook, No. 08-15-00040-CV, 2016 WL 
6092963 (Tex. App. Oct. 19, 2016). 
 
A property owner (“Grantor”) leased his minerals 
retaining a one-eighth royalty in the production. The 
Grantor then deeded an undivided one-sixteenth interest 
in all minerals to a Grantee but “covers and includes 
[one-half] of all of the oil royalty” due under the first 
lease “[a]nd it shall never be necessary for said grantee 
or his assigns to join I the execution of any future leases 
made on said lands.” Successors of both the Grantor 
and Grantee (collectively “Successors”) agree the lease 
expired, and the Grantor’s successors entered a new 
lease with the Operator that filed this suit asserting the 
deed was ambiguous: it was uncertain whether the 
Grantee’s successors owned (1) one-sixteenth of the 
production in any lease on the property regardless of 
the royalty set by the lease or (2) half of the royalty 
interest set by the terms of the lease. Successors filed 
cross-claims seeking declaratory relief and motions for 
summary judgment. A party holding a royalty without 
owning the mineral interest is a non-participating 
royalty holder; parties can express this type of interest 
as a fraction of the total royalty or as a floating royalty 
(varying with the size of the landowner’s royalty). 
Based on the “four corners” approach, the court viewed 
these seemingly conflicting fractions in the only way 
that would reconcile the two: the Grantor’s intent must 
have been a permanent one-half mineral interest. This 
also supports the “legacy of the one-eighth royalty”—
the standard royalty in all lease agreements at the time 
of the lease in question.  
 
HighMountain Expl. & Prod. LLC v. Harrison Ints., 
Ltd., NO. 14-15-00058-CV, 2016 WL 5853302 (Tex. 
App.—Houston 14th Dist. Oct. 6, 2016). 
 
Following its reservation of an NPRI in certain real 
property, a royalty owner executed a royalty agreement 
with the operator’s predecessor in interest. A dispute 
arose concerning the interpretation of two provisions. 
First, the owner claimed that the operator improperly 
withheld the owner’s share of “gross proceeds” from 
gas produced and used as fuel for the operator’s 
equipment. The agreement defined “gross proceeds” as 
“the entire economic benefit” the operator received 
from such production. In affirming the trial court’s 
judgment for the owner, the court of appeals reasoned 
that the operator’s benefit was not having to purchase 
fuel elsewhere. And contrary to the operator’s assertion, 
the record clearly showed it was possible to quantify 
this benefit. Second, the owner claimed that the 
operator wrongly deducted marketing costs from its 
share based on the cost of operating certain 
compressors. Under the agreement, the operator 
could only deduct such costs if the compressors were 
“downstream from a central facility.” Because the 
owner proved as a matter of law that the compressors 
were not downstream, the court held that operator 
had breached the agreement and affirmed the trial 
court’s judgment for the owner. 
 
 
Richardson v. Mills, No. 12-15-00170-CV, 2016 WL 
7488860 (Tex. App., Dec. 30, 2016). 
 
Appellants appealed the trial court decision in 
favor of the Appellees, determining they own a one-
half interest in the oil, gas, and other minerals 
described in two instruments. The appellate court 
reviewed the two instruments. Appellants argued that 
the first instrument constituted an unambiguous 
mineral deed to Appellants rather than a lease as 
ruled by the trial court. The appellate court agreed. 
Appellants argue that the second instrument refers to 
an unrecorded oil and gas lease, whereas the 
Appellees state that the second instrument refers to 
the first instrument, the mineral deed. Appellees 
argue that the second instrument contains a “latent 
ambiguity” which allows for the use of extrinsic 
evidence to prove the intent of the parties.  The 
appellate court disagreed and ruled the second 
instrument to be unambiguous; therefore, extrinsic 
evidence was inadmissible.  The appellate court 
rejected Appellants claim to review a stipulation 
made granting an undivided 4.1666% of the disputed 
mineral interest. Thus, the Appellees hold no interest 
in the oil, gas and other minerals in the described 
property, save the stipulated 4.1666%.  
 
Shell W. E & P, Inc. v. Pel-State Bulk Plant, LLC, 
No. 04-15-00750-CV, 2016 WL 6247007, (Tex. App. 
Oct. 26, 2016). 
 
An oil company appealed a $3 million judgment 
against it from an oil field services sub-contractor. 
The oil company hired a contractor to perform 
fracking services on a 106,000-acre mineral lease in 
Texas. The contractor then hired a subcontractor to 
provide fuel and other services in the exploration of 
the lease. The sub-contractor sent a lien claim notice 
to the oil company, which informed it that the 
contractor was not paying for the work on the lease. 
The sub-contractor later perfected a mineral lien and 
eventually sued the oil company and the contractor 
for the unpaid amount. The contractor filed for 
bankruptcy, and the oil company sold its interests on 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol2/iss5/7
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the lease. On appeal, the oil company argued that the 
sub-contractor should not be granted the cumulative 
sum of the contracts between the oil company and the 
contractor and instead should only be awarded the sum 
of contracts where the sub-contractor provided services. 
The appeals court affirmed and held that the subsequent 
agreements between the oil company and the contractor 
were all part of one contract because there was no 
language in the fracking agreement to support that each 
well agreement or work order was a separate contract. 
The oil company also argued that under Texas law, the 
oil company could only be liable for the amount the oil 
company owed to the subcontractor on the lien notice 
date. The appeals court held that because the dealings 
between the oil company and the contractor were part 
of one contract and the oil company owed $10 
million to the contractor at the time of the lien notice, 
the sub-contractor could recover the $3.2 million 
from the oil company.  
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SELECTED WATER DECISIONS 
 
Federal 
 
9th Circuit 
 
Sierra Club v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 840 F.3d 
1106 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 
An environmental group challenged the 
environmental impact statement (“EIS”) accompanying 
an agency’s regional plan update (“Plan”) for the Lake 
Tahoe Region. The agency developed the Plan—which 
restricts development in the region—over more than a 
decade, incorporating recommendations from 
concerned citizens and local governments. The group 
primarily complained that the Plan inadequately 
addressed local effects of runoff, which it believed 
threatened the lake’s superior water quality. The trial 
court granted the agency’s motion for summary 
judgment, and the group appealed. In affirming, the 
court of appeals concluded that the EIS analysis of the 
effects of future development was not “arbitrary or 
capricious” and adequately addressed the Plan’s 
impacts. It also held that substantial evidence support 
the EIS assumption concerning best management 
practices—which aim to prevent pollutants from 
entering the water—even though the agency had 
struggled to enforce such practices in the past. 
 
State 
 
Arizona 
 
Silver v. Pueblo Del Sol Water Co., 384 P.3d 814 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2016). 
 
A private water company sought a water supply 
designation, which would allow it to supply water to a 
planned residential development. BLM filed an 
objection, asserting that the company failed to consider 
BLM’s existing claim to water about a nearby 
conservation area. BLM could not quantify its right to 
water; the extent of its claim remained uncertain, 
pending the conclusion of an ongoing suit between 
numerous claimants. The Department of Water 
Resources (“Department”) denied BLM’s objection, 
concluding that the company’s application satisfied the 
designation requirements. BLM appealed, and an ALJ 
found that BLM failed to show the Department’s 
decision was contrary to law. BLM then filed a 
complaint in state court. The trial court vacated the 
ALJ’s decision, concluding that the Department must 
consider existing legal claims in evaluating water 
supply availability for designations. On review, the 
court of appeals vacated the trial court’s decision. First,  
 
the court held that Department properly determined 
that water  
 
would be “continuously, legally and physically 
available” for the company’s operation. Next, the 
court stated that while the Department need not 
“specifically quantify” BLM’s water rights, it must 
“consider” BLM’s rights in regulating designations. 
Finally, the court held that the Department need not 
separately evaluate the impact of pumping on the 
nearby conservation area. 
 
Montana 
 
Granite Cty. Bd. of Commissioners v. McDonald, 383 
P.3d 740 (Mont. 2016). 
 
A farmer downstream of a hydroelectric dam 
operated by the county sued the county for failing to 
release the water required for him to irrigate his 
crops. The county claimed the creek was merely low 
and no water could pass through the dam. Applying 
the Schuh Decree—which held that downstream 
users have the right to the natural flow of the stream, 
nothing more—the county argued the creek would 
naturally have periods of reduced water. But the 
farmer argued that the county should maintain the 
average natural flow because it was responsible for 
releasing water at a set rate. The court sided with the 
county, stating that a downstream claimant only has a 
right to the water that flows into the dam, not the 
water held within the dam. 
 
New Mexico 
 
State Eng'r of New Mexico v. Diamond K Bar Ranch, 
LLC, 385 P.3d 626 (N.M. 2016). 
 
Farmers sought to dismiss the state engineer’s 
complaint over the farmers use of appropriated water 
to irrigate farmland that was not part of the permitted 
water right. The farmers argued that the state 
engineer did not have statutory authority over the 
diverted water because the diversion began in 
Colorado and flowed into New Mexico through a 
ditch. The farmers also argued permits were 
unnecessary because the ditch was in existence 
before a state water appropriation law. The Supreme 
Court of New Mexico held the State Engineer did 
have jurisdiction to enjoin the farmers from using the 
water from the ditch on farmland outside the area of 
the ditch because the State Engineer could apply for 
an injunction against anyone for unlawful use or 
water diversion without a legal right to do so. The 
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farmers argued that the water used came from a man-
made ditch so the waters are private and the State 
Engineer cannot regulate a private water way. The court 
held that no water within New Mexico is private and 
that users only have a right to use a certain amount of 
water for beneficial use. The court held that the ditch 
was a community ditch, which did not require the 
farmers to acquire a permit to use the water on 
appurtenant land. However, the court held that for the 
farmers to use the water on land that was not 
appurtenant the farmers, they must file for a permit with 
the State Engineer.   
 
South Carolina 
 
Simmons v. Berkeley Elec. Coop., Inc., No. 2013-
001477, 2016 WL 6520167 (S.C., Nov. 2, 2016).  
 
A landowner sued for trespass and unjust 
enrichment against two separate utility companies for 
their use of his land for water and power lines. The trial 
court granted summary judgement in favor of the utility 
companies, which the appellate court affirmed in part 
and reversed in part.  The Supreme Court of South 
Carolina first clarified the elements of a “perspective 
easement.” The court noted that the terms “adverse use” 
and “claim of right” do not constitute separate options 
to prove perspective easement; rather, these terms are 
the same. The court, therefore, determined that a 
genuine issue of fact existed regarding whether the 
water utility’s use of the landowner’s groundwater was 
open and notorious because the water was underground, 
bushes hid the meter, and the location of the water main 
was not widely known, precluding summary judgment 
on utility’s claim for prescriptive easement. The court 
affirmed the prescriptive easement for the distribution 
line at the point it crossed the landowner’s property, 
however, because utility supervisors indicated that the 
line operated for thirty years without interruption and 
was visible from the road.  
 
Texas 
 
City of Socorro v. Campos, No. 08-14-00295-CV, 2016 
WL 4801600 (Tex. App. 2016). 
 
When a new subdivision built in a natural flood 
zone flooded, the city built several drainage channels to 
divert water away from the neighborhood. The channels 
instead brought the flood waters to another 
neighborhood that had never flooded before, and its 
residents were denied flood insurance for not being in a 
“flood prone” area. The new channels resulted in one to 
three feet of flooding, and the homeowners sued the 
city under the state takings clause and for nuisance. The 
city asked for dismissal of the claim contending one 
flood was not enough for a required taking, but the 
court has shown several times that multiple flooding 
events are important evidence for proof but are not a 
pleadings requirement. The court only decided on the 
pleadings, and for those purposes, the homeowners 
have provided enough to meet the lower standard of 
proof for pleas, even with skepticism of their ability 
to meet the substantial evidentiary burden in court.  
 
Virginia 
 
TransCanada Hydro Ne. Inc. v. Town of 
Rockingham, 2016 VT 100.  
 
A privately owned hydroelectric power plant 
(“Taxpayer”) challenged the property valuation by a 
municipality (“Town”) at about $108 million. The 
Taxpayer’s expert witness, an engineer, used an 
income-based discounted cash flow (“DCF”) analysis 
to determine an $84 million fair market value. The 
Town’s expert, an appraiser, also used a DCF method 
along with a comparable sales approach, and taking 
both into account came to a value of $130 million 
and $108.5 million attributable to the Town. The 
experts differed in areas such as the number of years 
used for average power (and income) generation and 
equity rates. The rejection of the taxpayer’s witness’s 
uncommon approach by the court and its reliance on 
the accepted methods and explanations provided by 
the Town’s witness were within the court’s 
discretion. The Taxpayer claimed the Town’s 
valuation did not account for adjustments in its 
comparable sales analysis, but the Town’s expert 
accounted for the plant’s location, taxpayer’s control 
of the river system, ability to sell into multiple 
markets, high overhead, facility conditions, and on 
and off-peak generation when adjusting twelve 
similar market sales. The court upheld all decisions to 
rely on the Town’s witness except the comparable 
sales, which were only offers of sales and never 
completed, and adjusted the price to $127.4 million. 
 
Washington  
 
Center for Envtl. Law v. Washington Dep’t of 
Ecology, 383 P.3d 608 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016) 
 
An environmental group appealed the 
government agency’s approval of a hydroelectric 
dam, claiming the government agency erred in 
approving the project without studies. The court 
looked to state law regarding the flow requirements 
for hydroelectric projects and found that, for the 
environmental group to overturn the approval of the 
project, it had the burden of demonstrating that 
approval violates the state mandated minimum flow 
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requirements—a burden the group failed to meet. The 
agency properly followed state law in exercising their 
ability to approve projects. Additionally, the agency did  
not abuse discretion in not waiting to approve the 
project before a final determination of the study.
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SELECTED WIND DECISIONS
 
State 
 
Montana 
 
NorthWestern Corp. v. Montana Dep't of Pub. Serv. 
Regulation, Montana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 380 P.3d 
787 (Mont. 2016). 
 
An electric company appealed the decision of the 
Public Service Commissioner (“Commissioner”) that 
the electric company failed to act prudently in their 
risk management practices. Montana law allows a 
utility company to increase rates to cover unexpected 
costs of doing business if approved by the 
Commissioner. When the electric company built a new 
system that required ramping up energy production 
with turbines, the company insured its equipment but 
did not insure the costs of purchasing energy if 
production machines broke down. The turbines did 
break down, and the company began purchasing 
energy, resulting in nearly $1.5 million of unexpected 
expenses. The Commissioner did not allow the 
company to recover this cost through increased rates. 
On appeal, the court agreed with the Commissioner 
that the company was not prudent in their risk 
management as they failed to inquire about additional 
insurance for the cost of purchasing energy. A 
company does not have to purchase insurance to be 
prudent, but it must research insuring that risk. 
 
Pennsylvania  
 
Sunrise Energy, LLC v. FirstEnergy Corp., 148 A.3d 
894 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016). 
 
A solar power generator (“Seller”) and electric 
distribution company (“Buyer”) executed an 
agreement under which the Buyer agreed to purchase 
the Seller’s excess electricity. Later, the Buyer 
terminated the agreement and refused to pay the 
Seller, alleging that the Seller was not a “customer-
generator” within the meaning of a state alternative 
energy statute (“Act”). The Seller sued the Buyer on 
contract claims and sought a declaration of its 
“customer-generator” status. The Buyer filed 
objections, arguing that the statue utility commission 
(“Commission”) had exclusive jurisdiction over 
questions concerning the Act. The trial court 
dismissed the Buyer’s objections, reasoning it was 
competent to resolve the case as a matter of statutory 
construction. The Buyer appealed the jurisdictional 
issue, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Buyer 
argued that the Commission had exclusive jurisdiction  
 
 
over the “customer-generator” question or, 
alternatively, had primary jurisdiction such that the  
 
court should defer to it before deciding the other 
claims. The court disagreed with both arguments, 
reasoning that statutory construction is a matter for the 
courts. Moreover, the Commission had no authority to 
resolve matters arising under the Act—the legislature 
had not given it that power. Finally, the court stated 
that jurisdiction with Commission was not necessary 
to preserve consistent interpretation of the Act. 
Commission’s expertise, the court concluded, “is not a 
talisman dissolving a court’s jurisdiction.” 
 
Texas 
 
North Shore Energy, L.L.C. v. Harkins, 501 S.W.3d 
598 (Tex. 2016). 
 
An energy company entered an option agreement 
with landowners to lease multiple parcels of land, 
paying per acre. The described land is “1210.8224 
acres of land, more or less, out of the 1673.69 acres” 
in an attachment referencing another lease. The 
referenced lease explicitly excluded a 400-acre tract of 
the 1,674 acres. The energy company attempted to 
exercise its option and drilled a well within the 400 
acres. The landowners then leased the 400-acre tract to 
a second company. The energy company sued the 
landowners for breach of contract, claiming a 
reasonable interpretation included the 400-acre tract. 
The energy company claimed up to any 1,210 acres of 
the 1,674 acres of land described was in the option. 
The court, however, disagreed with this interpretation 
because the lease twice deemed the land around 1,210 
in size, and the energy company paid for that exact 
acreage. Furthermore, the referenced lease explicitly 
exempts the 400 acres from the 1,674-acre tract. The 
court decided the only reasonable interpretation was 
that the option lease excluded the 400-acre tract, and 
the energy company had no cause of action against 
landowners because it had not yet exercised the option 
agreement. 
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SELECTED AGRICULTURE DECISIONS
 
Federal 
 
9th Circuit 
 
All. for the Wild Rockies v. Christensen, No. 14-
35069, No. 14-35123 (9th Cir. Nov. 1, 2016). 
 
The United States Forest Service and the United 
States Fish & Wildlife Service (collectively 
“agencies”) initiated two projects in the Gallatin 
National Forest. An activist group sued for an 
injunction under the Endangered Species Act 
(“ESA”), claiming the agencies’ activities would 
cause irreparable harm to the lynx and grizzly bear 
populations in the area. The court held that the 
agencies adequately considered the effects of road 
density and helicopter logging; therefore, they did not 
act arbitrarily or capriciously regarding the grizzly 
bear issue. The agencies did not, however, use 
specific location information on conducting the 
research for the lynx, so the court upheld the 
injunction on the agencies until they conducted 
adequate research considering effects to the lynx 
population. 
 
State 
 
Georgia  
 
Nemchik v. Riggs, 792 S.E.2d 347 (Ga. 2016). 
 
Lot 9 went through foreclosure and the plaintiff 
bought it with the intent to develop it; the defendant, 
however, claimed an easement on the property and 
began clearing trees. The plaintiff sought an 
injunction to prevent the defendant from entering the 
property until the court could decide whether an 
easement existed, which the court granted. The 
defendants appealed, claiming the plaintiff failed to 
show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits 
and that the defendant’s injury outweighed the 
possible injury to the plaintiff—both necessary for an 
injunction. On appeal, the court found that the 
defendants offered no evidence of their easement, 
losing the first point, and cleared trees causing 
irreparable damage, losing the second point. The 
court upheld the injunction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illinois  
 
AUI Const. Grp., LLC v. Vaessen, 2016 IL App (2d) 
160009.  
 
Property owners entered an agreement granting a 
wind energy developer (“Developer”) an easement on 
their property. Afterward, the developer entered an 
agreement with a general contractor (“Contractor”) to 
supply the wind turbine and tower. The contractor 
manufactured wind turbines but entered a fixed-
priced contract with a wind turbine company 
(“Company”) to design a prototype tower to support 
its wind turbines. The Company entered a cost-plus 
agreement with a sub-contractor to build the 
foundation and tower it designed. Once completed, 
the sub-contractor billed an amount greater than $5 
million. The Company paid in part, leaving a balance 
of approximately $3 million. The sub-contractor filed 
arbitration demand against the Company and the 
arbitrator entered an award of approximately $3.5 
million despite the Company filing for bankruptcy. 
The sub-contractor filed to foreclose a mechanic’s 
lien against the Owners for the work it performed for 
the Company because its labor improved the 
property. The owners filed a motion to dismiss the 
sub-contractor’s complaint. The contractor filed a 
motion for summary judgment on the sub-
contractor’s claims. Both motions asserted that the 
wind turbines remained the Developer’s personal 
property and constituted a non-lienable trade fixture 
and not an improvement to the property. The trial 
court, applying three factors from Crane Erectors & 
Riggers, Inc. v. La Salle National Bank, 466 N.E. 2d 
397 (1984) to determine whether equipment becomes 
a lienable fixture, granted both motions concluding 
that the turbines remained Developer’s personal 
property and were unlienable. The sub-contractor 
appealed, but the appellate court affirmed the trial 
court’s application of Crane and other factors such as 
the easement agreement that provided additional 
evidentiary support that the turbines constructed by 
sub-contractor remained personal property of the 
Developer. 
 
Oklahoma  
 
Calvert v. Swinford, 382 P.3d 1028 (Okla. 2016). 
 
When landowners sold their property, not 
intending to sell the minerals, they hired an attorney 
and abstract company to make sure the transaction 
went as planned. The deed sent to them to sign did 
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not reserve the mineral rights, so landowners sent it 
to the lawyer, who claimed to have fixed it. The 
landowners never read the deeds filed in 2002, which 
did not reserve mineral rights to the original owners. 
In 2014, the landowners filed suit against the lawyer, 
the royalty company, and the abstract company. 
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment 
because the claim was years past the statute of 
limitations. Landowners contended that the statute of 
limitations did not start with the filing of the deed but 
when they first learned of the mistake in the deeds in 
2013. Applying the discovery rule would allow the 
statute of limitations to start in 2013, but the court 
has only applied that rule in circumstances where 
negligence was not discoverable to plaintiffs 
exercising due diligence. The landowners were not 
exercising due diligence as they did not take 
advantage of the opportunity and obligation to read 
the deed they signed. Therefore, the statute of 
limitations accrued from the time of filing.  
 
Oregon 
 
Martin v. Lane County, 383 P.3d 903 (Or. Ct. App. 
2016). 
 
A landowner filed a complaint for declaratory 
ruling in circuit court over the correct zoning and 
application of state law to a county’s zoning 
ordinances. The land was in an “Agriculture, 
Grazing, and Timber Raising” zone that had five-acre 
minimum lot sizes. Then a county ordinance rezoned 
the area as “Exclusive Farm Use” with a forty-acre 
minimum lot size. The landowner attempted to build 
and develop the land per its earlier zoning and lot 
size but the county’s land management department 
denied it. The county claimed that land use decisions 
were the exclusive jurisdiction of the Land Use 
Board of Appeals of Oregon (“LUBA”). The court 
found that the complaint did qualify as a land use 
decision, and landowner could not bring a declaratory 
judgment action on a question of interpretation of 
County ordinance because it was under exclusive 
jurisdiction of LUBA.  
Pennsylvania  
 
Balady Farms, LLC v. Paradise Twp. Zoning 
Hearing Bd., 148 A.3d 496 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016).  
 
Farmer sought judicial review of a township 
zoning board’s decision denying the farmer a zoning 
permit for a poultry processing facility on his 
property because the proposed facility did not fall 
within the ordinance’s definition of “agriculture” 
interpreted by the board. While the ordinance did not 
expressly prohibit the farmer’s proposed facility, it 
defined “agriculture” as “‘[a]n enterprise that is 
actively engaged in the commercial production and 
preparation . . . [of poultry] and [poultry] products.’” 
But the ordinance did not define the words 
“commercial,” “production,” or “preparation.” The 
board based its conclusion that the definition of 
“agriculture” does not include a commercial poultry 
processing facility on the history of agriculture within 
the township and comments by property owners 
adjacent to the farmer’s property. To resolve the 
dispute, the commonwealth court referenced the 
ordinance that explicitly stated “[w]ords, phrases, and 
terms not . . . defined shall be used in their ordinary 
context’” and dictionary definitions and then 
compared these facts to Tinicum Township v. 
Nowicki, 99 A.3d 586 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).  In 
Tinicum, the Board denied a property owner a zoning 
permit for an on-site mulching operation because the 
mulch raw materials did not originate on the 
property. Here, the court concluded that because the 
farmer raised the chickens on the property, this 
operation is distinguishable.  Based on the State’s 
Municipalities Planning Code defining agricultural 
activities as “‘some connection to or utilization of the 
land itself.’” Therefore, the proposed facility fell 
within the definition of “agriculture” as used in the 
ordinance. 
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